Challenges and priorities for EU’s next High Representative
2019 marks the tenth anniversary of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. One of its key
promises was a more coherent, effective and visible Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). No single innovation encapsulates this promise more than the creation of the post of
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the
European Commission (HR/VP).
When the post was created, EU insiders commented that it was an ‘impossible job’. The
officeholder has to juggle numerous ‘hats’ and responsibilities. These include leading the
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA),
chairing the Foreign Affairs Council, and coordinating the Commission’s external activities.
The HR/VP is to put the CFSP into effect, bridge the supranational and intergovernmental
sides of EU external action, and ensure consistency between internal and external policies.
Moreover, being the Union’s chief diplomat requires a vast array of encounters in Brussels
and around the world.
On 1 November 2019, the third post-Lisbon HR/VP is due to take office. Commission
President von der Leyen tasked HR/VP-nominee Josep Borrell to deliver a “more strategic,
more assertive and more united Europe in the world”. Expectations on him are high in light of
the magnitude of international challenges and fierce geopolitical competition. However, the
HR/VP will also have to cope with an upgraded version of the post’s old structural
The first post-Lisbon HR/VP Catherine Ashton was criticised for her inability to juggle her
various hats. She was relatively absent from the European Commission and failed to
coordinate Commissioners dealing with EU external action. She was also seen as lacking
ambition regarding the EU’s security and defence policy, positioning the EU solely as a
civilian power. Her key achievement was setting up the EEAS and bringing officials from the
Commission, the former Council Secretariat and the member states together under one roof.
With more benevolent hindsight she was also praised for her role as a mediator in the
Serbia-Kosovo talks and the negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal.
The second post-Lisbon HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, learnt from Ashton’s mistakes. In a
symbolic gesture she moved her cabinet to the Commission’s Berlaymont building. She
regularly chaired meetings of the Commissioners dealing with external action. Mogherini also
made a point of playing her defence role to the full. She launched a major strategic review
process, leading to the first update of the 2003 European Security Strategy, and particularly
pushed for its implementation in the area of security and defence.
Nevertheless, her record is mixed. She was praised for her visibility around the globe and for
being an excellent communicator, but she was also seen as lacking focus and clear-cut
priorities. It certainly did not help her legacy that Ashton’s achievements regarding Iran and
the Balkans crumbled under her watch.
The challenge awaiting the third HR/VP could be described as juggling hats while someone
is throwing balls at him. He will have to link the EEAS and EDA with the so-called
‘Geopolitical Commission’, referring to the fact that almost all internal EU policies also have
external aspects. In addition to chairing the Commission’s group on a Stronger Europe in the
World, he will have to provide weekly updates on foreign policy to the College. While his
coordination tasks increased, his standing in the Commission was downgraded through the
creation of three executive Vice-Presidents directly reporting to the President.
The President also decided to create a new DG Defence Industry and Space that will likely
step onto the turf of the EEAS and the EDA. Instead of placing this DG under the
responsibility of the HR/VP (as suggested elsewhere) it will report to the executive VP for a
Europe Fit for the Digital Age. The HR/VP is supposed to ensure that all work on defence is
coherent, but the proposed institutional set-up enhances an old challenge: the HR/VP and
the EEAS are meant to provide strategic guidance and coordinate, but the bulk of resources
remain in the Commission. The HR/VP will have to counteract the creation of new silos to
avoid a broadening gap between Europe’s defence policy and its industrial aspects.
Finally, his already busy agenda will have to accommodate two of the President’s general
demands to the College: visits to every member state during the first half of the mandate and
forging a special partnership with the European Parliament.
Still no single telephone number
The central challenge facing the HR/VP is that of forging consensus among the member
states that goes beyond the lowest common denominator. In an interview in May 2019,
Borrell complained that the Foreign Affairs Council was not a centre of decision-making but
rather a “valley of tears” where condolences and concern is expressed without any capacity
for action. Mogherini had already expressed her frustration with the workings of the Foreign
Affairs Council during her hearing in 2014. She suggested “we can probably make better use
of our time and the time of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs if we plan for strategic thinking in
that format too”. However, distilling strategic thought from 28 member states proved harder
The key question thus remains: how do you get member states to agree on joint action when
preferences differ? This applies to the EU’s relations with Russia and China as much as its
responses to crises in Venezuela or Libya. In her mission letter to Borrell, von der Leyen
suggested one way out: use the Treaty clauses allowing for certain CFSP decisions to be
taken by qualified majority vote. However, this is at best a longer-term option as a whole
range of member states refuse yielding sovereignty in this domain.
Making the impossible possible
The post of the HR/VP still looks much like an impossible job. Just like his predecessors, he
will inevitably have to disappoint someone. Notwithstanding, he should start with a high level
of ambition and take three steps to try to make the impossible possible:
First, he should become the central coordinator for the EU’s geopolitical role without
spending all his time on coordination. To this end, he should use the first 100 days of his
mandate to review the EEAS and bolster its capacity for strategic thinking. An upgraded
strategic planning unit could liaise with the Commission services to prepare his weekly
foreign policy updates to the College. These briefings should be used to make concrete
suggestions on putting the comprehensive approach and strategic autonomy into action.
Second, the HR/VP should strike the right balance between visibility and focus. He should
establish a well-crafted network of Special Representatives and special envoys to ensure the
EU’s visibility and presence in key geographic and substantive areas of collective interest.
He himself should focus on a distinct set of priorities where he actually has a common voice
to represent. This will include some of his predecessors’ priorities namely Iran, the Balkans
and the Sahel zone as well as upcoming crises or negotiations.
Third, the HR/VP should test the boundaries of his leadership role vis-à-vis the member
states. Transforming the Foreign Affairs Council into a real centre for decision-making will
require more than a revision of its working methods. His key priority should be internal
mediation on key contentious issues such as the EU’s approach towards Russia, China and
the US. This will require informal shuttle diplomacy and skilful coalition-building. This also
applies to the extension of qualified majority voting. The HR/VP could, for instance, use the
required visits to all member states during the first half of the Commission mandate to lead a
systematic discussion on the options and areas of application of the respective Treaty
Demystifying the ‘Solana myth’
Whether the member states and other institutional actors will allow for a less restrained
leadership role of the HR/VP remains to be seen. When reflecting on this question, EU
foreign policy connoisseurs often nostalgically refer to the era under the first and only pre-
Lisbon High Representative Javier Solana. He did not have the legal competences, they say,
but he had the standing, charisma and determination to push through difficult compromises.
He built his legitimacy on output rather than process. The third post-Lisbon officeholder will
prove if this kind of leadership by action is a matter of personal capacity or whether the EU
did indeed create an ‘impossible job’.
The article gives the views of the author, not the position of ‘Europe’s Futures
Ideas for Action’ project or the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM).